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With a majority of ‘Yes’ votes in the Constitutional Referendum of 2017, Turkey continues its
transition from democracy to autocracy. By the will of the Turkish people, this referendum trans-
ferred practically all executive power to president Erdog˘an. However, the referendum was confronted
with a substantial number of allegations of electoral misconducts and irregularities, ranging from
state coercion of ‘No’ supporters to the controversial validity of unstamped ballots. In this note
we report the results of an election forensic analysis of the 2017 referendum to clarify to what ex-
tent these voting irregularities were present and if they were able to influence the outcome of the
referendum. We specifically apply novel statistical forensics tests to further identify the specific
nature of electoral malpractices. In particular, we test whether the data contains fingerprints for
ballot-stuffing (submission of multiple ballots per person during the vote) and voter rigging (coer-
cion and intimidation of voters). Additionally, we perform tests to identify numerical anomalies
in the election results. We find systematic and highly significant support for the presence of both,
ballot-stuffing and voter rigging. In 6% of stations we find signs for ballot-stuffing with an error
(probability of ballot-stuffing not happening) of 0.15% (3 sigma event). The influence of these vote
distortions were large enough to tip the overall balance from ‘No’ to a majority of ‘Yes’ votes.
PACS numbers:
In 1996, Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an, then-mayor of Istan-
bul, remarked that democracy can be compared with
a bus ride, “once I reach my stop, I get off” [1]. It
seems that he arrived at one of these stops on April 16,
2017, when Turkish people went to the polls to vote on a
constitutional reform package that among others would
replace Turkey’s parliamentary system with a presiden-
tial one. The ‘Yes’ won by a slight margin 51.4% to
48.6% or 1.38 million votes. The narrow victory has been
questioned by opposition forces alleging voting irregular-
ities and even electoral fraud [2, 3]. Some videos circu-
lated of alleged electoral malpractices on the day of the
election [3]. There were reports on unverified (i.e. un-
stamped) ballots being cast, state coercion of ‘No’ sup-
porters, and election observers being kept from polling
places [2]. The OSCE/ODIHR election observers noted
that the referendum took place on an “unlevel playing
field” and that “observers were impeded in their observa-
tion during opening and voting” [4]. Further, there were
reported cases of police presence at polling stations, po-
lice checking voter identification before granting access,
as well as significant changes in the ballot validity crite-
ria, effectively “undermining an important safeguard and
contradicting the law” [4]. Note that until the 2017 ref-
erendum, there were no indications that electoral fraud
was a major concern in Turkish elections [5, 6].
For a timely identification of electoral misconduct and
to enable more targeted and efficient election observa-
tion missions, the newly emerging field of election foren-
sics seeks to diagnose – on a fully quantitative and data-
driven basis – to which extent a given type of malpractice
might have impacted the outcome of an election [7]. Of-
ten these tests focus on a disproportionate abundance
of round numbers in the election results [8, 9] (reflect-
ing the human tendency to choose round numbers when
making up the results) or the over-representation of cer-
tain digits in the results, i.e. violations of Benford’s Law
[10, 11]. Another type of election forensic tests aims at
identifying irregularities in the distributions of vote and
turnout numbers across polling stations, as well as cor-
relations between these distributions [12, 13, 15? , 16].
These statistical tools are often complemented by anal-
yses of secondary data, such as exit polls or survey- and
sampling data [17, 18].
In this note we analyze the election results of the 2017
Turkish constitutional referendum by using different elec-
tion forensics tools that have been recently proposed. We
first test the data for the systematic occurrence of ballot-
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2stuffing, i.e. the unlawful addition of a substantial num-
bers of ballots for a given party [15]. We then perform
a test for the occurrence of the systematic coercion and
intimidation of voters, i.e. a test for voter rigging [16].
Finally, we carry out two additional tests for statistical
irregularities, one based on the Second-Digit Benford’s
Law [11] and one based on the detection of outlier sup-
port [14].
ELECTION DATA
The election data were downloaded from the official
website of the Turkish election commission [21]. We only
considered results from Turkey itself, and did not include
election results from polling stations in other countries,
because the population eligible for voting was not clearly
defined outside of Turkey. In total, we analyze data for
166,679 polling stations grouped in 28,447 neighborhoods
(or villages), belonging to 1,057 different districts, which
are part of 81 provinces. For each polling station i, we
extracted the number of voters, Ni, the number of valid
votes or turnout, Ti, as well as the number of ‘Yes’ votes,
Vi. From these we obtained the relative turnout in per-
cent, ti = Ti/Ni, and the vote percentage, vi = Vi/Ti.
Descriptive statistics of the polling stations are shown in
table I, where we present mean values and standard devi-
ations for Ni, Ti, Vi, ti, and vi. Here and in the following
analysis we excluded polling stations with an electorate
of less than hundred people to rule out that our results
are driven by such outliers. It is important to stress that
the concrete placing of the threshold does not alter the
results. Almost identical results are obtained by placing
the threshold at 0, 50 or 200. About 1.3% of all votes are
not considered by implementing the threshold of 100.
The cumulative number of ‘Yes’ votes is shown as a
function of turnout in figure 1. For each level of turnout
shown on the x-axis, the total number of votes from sta-
tions with this level or lower is shown on the y-axis. The
vote percentages cross the 50% threshold with the inclu-
sion of polling stations with a turnout of close to 100%.
TABLE I: Descriptive statistics of polling stations in the 2017
Turkish constitutional referendum.
variable xi mean 〈xi〉 standard deviation σ(xi)
number of voters, Ni 332 109
turnout, Ti 285 86
Yes’ votes, Vi 146 74
relative turnout, ti 0.86 0.085
vote percentage, vi 0.53 0.23
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FIG. 1: For a given level of turnout, the cumulative vote
percentage of stations with this level or lower is shown. A
majority of more than 50% is achieved with the inclusion of
high-turnout stations.
BALLOT-STUFFING TEST
It has been shown that specific types of electoral fraud
introduce odd correlations between turnout and vote
numbers that can not be accounted for by demographic
or geographic characteristics [15]. The presence of such
correlations can be estimated by using so-called election
fingerprints, i.e. the joint vote-turnout distribution that
can be represented in 2-d histograms [15]. The finger-
print for the Turkish 2017 referendum is shown in figure
2(A), where the color intensity (blue) is proportional to
the number of polling stations with the corresponding
percentage of votes (x-axis) and turnout (y-axis). In the
absence of non-linear vote-turnout correlations, the bulk
of the distribution in figure 2(A) should show a circular or
elliptical symmetry. The occurrence of ballot-stuffing in
a district would inflate the turnout and at the same time
increase the vote percentages. If this happens in a sub-
stantial number of polling stations, the vote and turnout
numbers become correlated and the elliptical symmetry
in the fingerprints is broken. For the Turkey 2017 data
we observe a bulk that is spread out particularly along
the vote dimension, but is rather narrow in turnouts. For
high votes and high turnout, this bulk is clearly smeared
out towards the upper right corner of the plot, which is
fully consistent with a ballot-stuffing scenario.
To assess whether the deviations observed in the finger-
print are indeed statistically significant traces of ballot-
stuffing, we apply the parametric model that was pro-
posed in [15]. In a nutshell, this model assumes a finger-
print with normally distributed and independent vote-
and turnout numbers, with means and standard devi-
ations that were estimated from the data. The model
tests if the skew towards higher numbers in the observed
3vote distribution coincides with a similar skew in the
observed turnout distribution, as would be characteris-
tic for ballot-stuffing. The result is a fraud parameter,
fi, which represents the fraction of polling stations with
ballot-stuffing-like distortions in their respective vote and
turnout numbers [22] For the Turkey 2017 data we obtain
a non-zero fraud parameter,
fi = 0.058± 0.019 . (1)
Note that this is roughly a 3 sigma effect, meaning that
the mean of the distribution of fi is three standard devi-
ations from the assumption of no ballot-stuffing, which is
fi = 0. We find a shape parameter of α = 1.3± 0.2. The
shape parameter measures to which extent the ballot-
stuffing process in the parametric model is combined with
a deliberate wrong-counting or recasting of ballots. A
shape parameter larger than one indicates that ballot-
stuffing dominates over the wrong-counting process. This
means there is a highly significant effect in the Turkish
election fingerprint that is compatible with the ballot-
stuffing hypothesis. Compared with the irregularities ob-
served in recent Russian elections, these deviations are
relatively weak but nevertheless systematic and statisti-
cally significant.
VOTER RIGGING TEST
In some cases irregularities in the fingerprints can be
explained by geographic heterogeneities, for instance due
to different mobilization effects across urban and rural
areas. A way to account for such natural correlations in
the data is to compare each polling station to other sta-
tions that are in close geographic proximity [16]. In the
case of Turkey 2017, we compared the vote and turnout
numbers of each station to the average values that have
been observed in the same district. For a polling station
i in district A, we defined the electoral neighborhood,
Nb(i), as all other polling stations in A. The standard-
ized vote percentage of station i, Zv(i), is then given by
the Z score,
Zv(i) =
vi − µj∈Nb(i)(vj)
σj∈Nb(i)(vj)
, (2)
where µj∈Nb(i)(vj) and σj∈Nb(i)(vj) denote the mean and
standard deviation over all districts in the electoral neigh-
borhood of i, respectively. The standardized relative
turnouts are,
Zt(i) =
ti − µj∈Nb(i)(tj)
σj∈Nb(i)(tj)
. (3)
The so-called standardized fingerprint (2-d histogram of
the standardized vote and turnout numbers, Zv and Zt)
is shown in figure 2(B), [16]. Using this representation, it
becomes possible to address the issue of of voter rigging.
The key hypothesis in this test is that smaller polling sta-
tions are more susceptible to coercion and intimidation
of voters, since (i) it is easier to identify opposing indi-
viduals, (ii) there are fewer eyewitnesses, and (iii) such
stations are visited less frequently by election observers.
Consequently, voter rigging shows up in the standardized
fingerprint by a displacement (a shift towards higher vote
and higher turnout numbers, upper right corner) of the
fingerprint of small stations away from the fingerprint of
large stations. Small stations were defined as those with
an electorate size, Ni, that is located in the lowest p-th
percentile of all electorate sizes. In figure 2(C) we show
the standardized fingerprints in the form of “iso-density”
lines for small (red) and large (blue) polling stations for
p =10%. The size of the displacement generally depends
on the size threshold p and is denoted by δ(p), see ar-
row in figure 2(C). It is apparent that the fingerprints
for small stations are obviously shifted towards the up-
per right corner of the figure, as would be expected from
voter rigging. As for the ballot-stuffing case, a visual
examination of the (standardized) fingerprints alone is
not conclusive and a hypothesis test [16] is needed to
assess whether the observed displacement between small
and large polling stations is statistically significant and
indeed consistent with voter rigging. The idea behind
the test of Jimenez et al. [16] is to construct a baseline
for expected displacements between small and large sta-
tions based on a reference set of trustworthy elections.
From these elections a region of an “acceptable displace-
ment size” is derived. The acceptable displacement size
was obtained from an analysis of 21 different elections in
ten countries. For a detailed description of the test and
the data used, see [16]. Given the acceptable region, for
a given election, one can now check if the actually ob-
served displacement between small and large stations for
a range of size thresholds p, falls within this region. If the
displacement is larger than the 95% confidence interval of
displacements observed in the reference set, this signals
statistical significance at the 5% level. Here, we extend
this analysis to the data of the Turkish 2017 constitu-
tional referendum; results are shown in figure 3. In fig-
ure 3(A) we show the average displacement, δ(p) between
small and large stations in the standardized fingerprint
as a function of p for the extended dataset, including
the Turkey 2017 referendum. For small size thresholds
p, the Turkish data shows indeed larger displacements
than allowed for in the acceptable region. This indicates
statistically significant signs of voter rigging. Compared
to the Russia and Venezuela, the signatures for voter
rigging in Turkey are smaller, as it was in the ballot-
stuffing test. Finally we estimate the impact of the voter
rigging effect in the data. For this purpose we first rank
each polling station by its electorate size in decreasing
order, and then compute the cumulative vote percent-
ages, cumi(v) =
∑i
j<i Vi/
∑i
j<i Ti, over all stations with
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FIG. 2: Election forensic fingerprints for the Turkish constitutional referendum 2017. (A) The fingerprint shows the joint vote-
turnout distribution where the color intensity indicates the number of stations with a given vote and turnout. The distribution
is smeared out towards high vote and high turnout numbers, which is characteristic for ballot-stuffing. (B) Standardized
fingerprints as defined in the text; they can be used to adjust for geographic heterogeneities in the data. (C) Traces of voter
rigging can be identified by comparing the standardized fingerprints of small (red lines) and large (blue lines) polling stations.
Small stations are particularly susceptible to voter coercion and intimidation, which results in their displacement toward inflated
votes and turnout (shift of small stations shown as red lines toward the upper right corner).
a rank j less than i. In figure 3(B) we present cumi(v) as
a function of the rank. The signal for voter rigging can be
seen in the high rank region (small stations) of the cumu-
lative vote percentage curves, where a sharp increase for
the smallest stations is seen (circle). This signal for voter
rigging is a typical pattern that was also found in Russia
and Venezuela, see inset 1. In elections where no fraud-
ulent actions were reported, these patterns are missing,
see inset 2. For the Turkish constitutional referendum we
see that the cumulative effect of the distortions in small
stations was enough to tip the results toward a majority
of ‘Yes’ votes. Only with these distortions the cumulative
votes cross the 50% line in figure 3 B.
The voter rigging test also allows us to identify which
provinces in Turkey contributed most to the observed ir-
regularities. For this we computed the displacements,
δ(p), for each of the 81 provinces separately, treating
each province as if it were an individual country. One
can then average δ(p) over all used values of 0 < p < 90
to obtain a single number for the importance of the voter
rigging effects in each province. The ten provinces with
the strongest effects of voter rigging in decreasing order
are S¸anliurfa, Ku¨tahya, Bayburt, Du¨zce, Kı´l´ıs, C¸ankiri,
Gu¨mu¨s¸hane, Bolu, Kastamonu, Tokat with respective av-
erage of δ(p) around two and maximal displacements that
range from 2.9 to 4.3. These provinces are spread more
or less equally over the entire country but tend to have a
low population density (i.e. four of the above provinces
rank among the ten least populated provinces, whereas
the most populated one is Du¨zce at rank 15 of 81).
FURTHER TESTS FOR STATISTICAL
IRREGULARITIES
The Benford test for the second significant digit is one
of the most commonly used tools in election forensics.
Benford’s Law states that the second significant digit of
the number of votes, Vi, must be a random number with
a certain, specified frequency distribution, namely a so-
called power law [11]. Deviations from this phenomeno-
logical law might indicate an influence of human thought
(such as rounding or cutting off certain numbers), how-
ever, it is not at all clear whether such deviations can be
related to concrete forms of electoral fraud [19]. Here, we
tested for Benford’s Law by following the protocol pro-
posed in [20]. Therefore, we consider only electoral units
with three significant digits for testing the null hypothe-
sis H0: The data is consistent with the Benford’s Law for
the second significant digit. As a measure of being right
when we assert H0 is true, we compute the Bayesian pos-
terior probability proposed by Pericchi and Torres [11],
denoted by P (H0|data). At the finest aggregation level
(polling stations), we observe a large deviation from the
law, with P (H0|data) < 10−120. As far as we know,
this discrepancy has been observed only in scenarios of
manipulating electoral data. We repeat the analysis for
the next data aggregation level (villages). They group
in average over 3 poling stations. Even at this aggre-
gation level, the distributions deviate significantly from
Benford’s Law, with P (H0|data) < 10−10. In all cases
considered so far, aggregated data distributed on such an
order of magnitude confirmed Benford’s Law [20]. The
significant deviations found in Turkey constitute there-
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FIG. 3: Results for the statistical test for voter rigging. (A)
An accepted region for the displacements is constructed from
the confidence interval of displacements observed in the ref-
erence set of trustworthy elections. There is a significant dis-
placement δ(p) between small and large polling stations with
values that lie outside this accepted region for Turkey 2017
(full, magenta line). The displacement sizes are substantially
smaller than those observed in Russian or recent Venezuelan
elections (shown as blue and red dashed lines). Reference
elections are shown as dotted lines. (B) We rank all stations
in Turkey by their size and show the cumulative vote percent-
age cumi(v) computed over all stations with a size larger than
the given rank. For higher ranks i, an increasing number of
small stations is included. It is the addition of small units
with inflated votes and turnouts that pushes the results over
the 50% line and leads to a majority of Yes’ votes (highlighted
by a red circle). In the insets, we show the same relationship
for other elections that (left) show significant displacements
or (right) belong to the set of reference elections.
fore a highly irregular observation, which was not even
found in Venezuelan data.
Another statistical test for irregularities in election
data is based on the assumption that voters are assigned
to polling stations in their villages in a way that should
not depend on their voting behavior. By randomly per-
muting the way how voters (as inferred from the data)
are assigned to polling stations in their village, a null
model can be formulated for the (non-)randomness of
the assignment of voters to their polling stations [20].
Following the test procedure described in [20], we found
that the standardized differences between a random and
the actual voter assignment were indeed systematically
out of the 99% normal confidence interval. Until now,
such extreme deviations have only been observed in cases
that where accompanied by a substantial amount of fraud
claims [20].
CONCLUSIONS
In this note we reported the results of an election foren-
sic analysis of the Turkish constitutional referendum in
2017. We applied several recently proposed statistical
tests to test for the elementary and low-tech mechanisms
of election fraud, ballot-stuffing and voter rigging, re-
spectively. For both we find systematic and statistically
significant indications in the data. In particular our anal-
ysis suggests the existence of ballot-stuffing in about 6%
of the polling stations and a combined effect with voter
rigging that was just large enough to change the out-
come of the referendum from ‘No’ to ‘Yes’. The official
report of the election observers [4] criticized (i) the valid-
ity of unstamped and unverified ballots during the elec-
tion and (ii) police presence at polling stations to check
voter identifications before granting access. The reported
large-scale addition of unverified ballots would clearly re-
sult in a positive test for ballot-stuffing, whereas voter
intimidation at the polling stations would show up as a
positive test for voter rigging. In this sense, the mere
presence of these types of electoral malpractices in the
Turkish referendum is not a new result per se. However,
our analysis shows for the first time in a quantitative and
data-driven way that the impact of these irregularities on
the election outcome was decisive in transforming Turkey
into an executive presidency.
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